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1). First of all, let us begin with an extremely general question. Ecology 
seems to be all the rage in the human sciences right now, and for very 
compelling reasons. Pressed with the almost preternatural urgency and 
the dangers of the so-called Anthropocene, ecology has leaped right at the 
forefront of our philosophical and scientific agendas. Nonetheless, the 
precise meaning of the word ‘ecology’ seems to be far from clear, ranging 
from a general and watered-down interconnectedness of all exists to a very 
complex and stratified revision of our place on this planet.  Do you think 
that Gilbert Simondon could be considered an «ecological thinker»? And 
if so, in what sense? And, in particular, is it possible to establish an 
analogy between the Simondonian notions of field and milieu and the 
concept of system of the philosophy of ecology, to explain in this case the 
intra-action1 between the individual and the environment? 
 
 First of all, I would like to state that I’m answering these questions as responsible 
for the edition of Gilbert Simondon’s work and not as a specialist. 
There is indeed in Gilbert Simondon’s work both an explicit thought of the 
whole of the real (L'individuation à la lumière des notions de forme et d'information)2 and 
a critical analysis of technics (Du mode d’existence des objects technique) 3. To establish 
that this constitutes an ecological thought would require first to define more 
precisely in what sense it is possible. Is his entire thought led by an ecological 
concern, a desire to protect nature? Or would he be sensitive, among other 
topics, to ecological problems, in other words to the degradation of nature by 
human activity? Both questions are legitimate, and I will start answering the 
latter, as it is probably more straightforward. 
Simondon is indeed sensitive to the dangerous and excessive aspects of 
human activity, not only at the scale of the planet, but also at the apparently 
more moderate scale of the living and safety conditions imposed to mankind as 
well as to the living in general by the evolution of technics. On this subject, his 
analyses are very clear and unveiled4 about technocratism and the Saint-
Simonism. He thinks that the technicism is «inspired by an unbridled will to 
conquer» and that «this aggressive conquest has the characteristics of a rape of 
 
* Translated from French by Dominique Simondon. All the citations in the article are translated 
from French to English by D. Simondon. The pages refer to the French original version of the 
texts. 
1For the concept of intra-action see K. Barad, Meeting the Universe Halfway. Quantum physics and 
entanglement of matter and meaning, Duke University Press, Durham/London 2007. 
Intra-action understands agency as not an inherent property of an individual or human, to be 
exercised between already established, static and monolithic terms that subsequently enter 
relation, but as a dynamism of relational and procedural forces in which all designated ‘things’ 
are constantly exchanging and diffracting, influencing and working inseparably.  
2 See G.Simondon, L'individuation à la lumière des notions de forme et d'information, Million, Grenoble, 
2005, (quoted as ILFI  through the text). 
3 See G. Simondon, Du mode d’existence des objects technique, Aubier, Paris 1958, (quoted as MEOT 
through the text). 
4 G.Simondon, Du mode d’existence des objects technique, p.177. 
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nature»5. In later lectures, he criticizes the consumer society, the waste or 
confiscation of resources, and he recognizes very early the ecologist efforts: see 
for instance the chapters of «Sur la technique, Trois perspectives pour une réflexion sur 
l’éthique et la technique»6, or «Les limites du progrès human»7. He writes: «In Algeria, 
gas discovered in Hassi-Messaoud by the oil industry is flared while men kill each 
other, and children starve nearby devastated fields and cold fireplaces»8. 
What makes his analysis an uncommon approach to the problem of 
ecology are mainly two things:  
 On the one hand, he does not exclude that some solutions to the 
problems created by technics be solved by technics itself, contrary to other 
thinkers who believe that technics is a risk in itself:  
 
It could be said that energy production by radioactivity could become 
acceptable and even desirable if it could make a leap forward. But this 
leap would be gigantic: from fission to fusion9.  
 
According to Simondon, technical excess is in fact not technical, it is 
political and economic: society is probably wrongly technician rather than too 
technician. For instance, the technical development does not originate 
technocratism:  
 
Technocratism represents the will to power which rises in a group of 
people possessing knowledge but no power.... Faust’s dream is not the 
one of every man at every time, it is the one of polytechnicians in a 
certain social configuration10.  
 
On the other hand, and it is a very important point, Simondon performs 
an analysis of the ecologist apprehensions themselves. What should be thought 
is the rapport of mankind to nature, taking into consideration economic, 
technical, cultural conditions, as well as the idea and the fear to see nature 
degraded. The 19th century is an example of an analysis of the advent of the fear 
of dangers linked to technology, in relation with the results of industrialization 
and technical excesses.  But more importantly, says Simondon in «Art et Nature», 
ecologists have a sense of nature as «temporal, energetic, dimensional primacy 
of the universe with respect to human species» 11, and therefore correct the 
technical optimism which was only an exaggeration due to «a temporarily carried 
away technical progress»12. They have the sense of the transcendence of nature 
with respect to mankind and its craft, and they care about the future. However, 
ecology, as a thought that defined itself primarily as a diagnosis of the problems 
of the rapport between mankind and nature, should become conscious of itself 
in order to find a true consistency. It should not misguide itself in excessive 
 
5 Ibidem. 
6 G.Simondon, Sur la techinque, PUF, Paris 2004,  pp. 337-351. 
7 Ivi, pp.269-278. 
8 Ivi, p.277. 
9 Ivi, p. 337. 
10 G.Simondon, Du mode d’existence des objects technique, p.177. 
11 Ivi, p. 198. 
 Ibidem. 
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fluency or be led by ignorance toward fallacious hate or rejection. For instance 
about early ecology, Simondon notes that sometimes it looks like an attitude 
probably inherited from the difficult experience of city life, of urban civilization, 
that leads to an aspiration to a certain wisdom, a sort of monasticism. In my 
opinion, this attitude, gentrified, could still be identified in what is today a partial, 
biased downtown ecology. But the ecological trend is very precious because it 
harbors a constructive ethics with its own norms and possibly its own limits, as 
is the case with every normativity. For this reason, it could be said that MEOT 
is a breviary for an ecology being conscious of the real relation between the 
various aspects of technical domination of nature. According to Simondon, the 
real thinker of technics is the one who thinks the rapport of mankind to nature 
through technics: the real thinker can only be an ecologist in a very broad sense, 
because only a grasping of the complete rapport of mankind to nature has a true 
value and can identify real imbalances. The part II of MEOT is an analysis of the 
questions of mankind and technics. The part III ends up in a very complete, very 
philosophical analysis of the genesis of technicity itself, in its relation to other 
forms of culture. What must be thought is the whole ensemble, and any veritable 
ecologist should do so, in order not to rely upon partial and misleading 
oppositions (as between technics and nature, or between mankind and technics). 
As an example, today, some people advocate the «all electric» in cities, while 
being insensitive to the fact that in the Rhone valley, schools must store iodine 
pills for children, in case of radioactive contamination. I believe that the 
introduction to MEOT could be understood as a call to a more accurate 
understanding of the cultural and political reasons behind a «wrongly technician» 
society, and these reasons are the same as those responsible for ecology to be 
translated nowadays under forms very unevenly relevant. 
 On the contrary, in the former sense of the question where his work 
could be seen as a general intention to advocate an ecological cause, I believe it 
would be excessive to think so, precisely because it would be restrictive. An 
ecological thought can be deducted from his work, but his work is not an ecology 
in the current sense of the word, because for it to be an ecology, there would be 
a need to define the terms and their value: mankind, environment, milieu, nature, 
technics, action, and even equilibrium, as well as a certain idea of objective 
knowledge, etc ... In his two major works, MEOT and ILFI, Simondon 
investigates all these terms, and many others such as individuation, form, 
information, potential, physical, living, psychical, social, collective...This is not 
primarily an ecological statement, but a radical effort to think the various levels 
of being, individuation and relations, as well as the meaning of thought and 
action. Your suggestion on the terms of milieu and environment which could be 
linked to the concept of system is interesting, under the condition to note that 
Simondon stresses much more on metastable equilibria, allowing new 
individuations, than on the idea of a relation of adaptation to a milieu or to any 
finite system. He insists on the inadequacy of a thought of the becoming in terms 
of adaptation, which questions the idea of a given system for which an optimum 
equilibrium could be determined.  
           I don’t feel competent to discuss the topic of intra-action, although it 
could be said that Simondon’s analysis of transductive reality could be of similar 
nature. Let us say at least that, at the lesser scale of the relation of man to nature, 
he stresses on an important distinction: for this rapport to be authentic, man 
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must free himself from group myths, from social pressure, as in the case of the 
Inventor who accesses this rapport to authentic real, and by doing so, 
demonstrates one of the technics privileges. 
 
2). In what terms can we speak of encyclopedism in the philosophy of 
Gilbert Simondon and to what extent the concept of transduction (as a 
biological, physical, mental, social dimension etc.) and the notion of 
paradigmatic analogies contribute to the constitution of a transdisciplinary 
and reticular reflection, creating the theoretical and practical space of a 
humanism with a scientific matrix  and vice versa of a science deeply 
imbued with humanism, towards an open and systemic axiomatics of the 
human, which goes beyond the monolithic boundaries between 
philosophy and science? 
 
First of all, can we talk about «encyclopedism» about this work? I don’t think so. 
It is clear that Gilbert Simondon has developed an interest for the Encyclopedia 
of the 18th century, for the encyclopedic movement. He has studied this 
movement at different historical times, and he celebrates its liberating nature, 
including in the case of the 20th century cybernetics. He writes:  
 
Modern encyclopedists are the scholars building automated 
documentation centers, i.e. the cyberneticians, these information 
technologists working in teams, developing a common thought, driven 
by their faith in this new postulate: the logical empiricism13. 
 
 Simondon also mentions its deficiencies for his own project, that is 
radically different.  
 When one reads ILFI, no attempt whatsoever to «encyclopedism» is 
apparent: the study of individuation does not aim at being exhaustive, because 
the question of science is only discussed in the perspective of its difficulty to 
face the question of individuation. Moreover, encyclopedism as a way of 
thinking is seen by Simondon as a state of mind, a commendable but insufficient 
trend more applicable to the rapport to technicity (cybernetician encyclopedism) 
or to the form to be given to a lecture on science (as in one of his lessons). ILFI 
is about something completely different: the ambition is not encyclopedic, it is 
not about circulating from one area of knowledge to another in order to exhaust 
the field of the real. On the contrary, it is about demonstrating that individuation, 
whatever its domain, cannot be fully known but can only be reflectively thought. 
Individuation escapes knowledge and science. This term of «encyclopedism» 
seems to me inappropriate and misleading, because it leads to think that the work 
contains a twofold objective: a concern of knowledge accumulation, and a 
concern of transversality. The terms of transduction and paradigmatic analogy 
are valuable, precisely because they forbid going beyond reflexive thought, on 
the subject of individuation domains. The transductivity of the real does not 
imply that knowledge circulates in all its domains; it forces to grasp reflectively 
the individuation levels and their thresholds, without allowing a general fiesta of 
the knowledge of everything, or of the whole, or of everything in the whole. It 
 
13 G.Simondon, Sur la philosophie, PUF, Paris 2016 , p. 129. 
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is not about completing science nor circulating constituted knowledge. It is 
about thinking the real with what science can offer as valuable for this, namely 
the problems that science identifies, but these problems must be thought 
differently than science does, because grasping individuation can only be 
performed reflectively. Simondon himself makes a distinction between 
knowledge and thought in the last paragraph of introduction to ILFI. It is, before 
anything else, a philosophical work. To drag this work on the side of 
encyclopedism would ruin the numerous precautions taken by Simondon in 
order for the thought of the real not to be the science maid. This point is 
perfectly explicit in the work. His reflection is not «transdisciplinary», for it is 
not «disciplinary» in the first place, and the limits shaken up by the concepts of 
analogy and transduction are not those existing between philosophy and science, 
but between domains of the real. I don’t believe at all that Simondon claims to 
correct or rectify science, apart for the case of social science, about axiomatic 
and principles. This leads us somehow to the end of your question, on 
humanism. 
 But prior to answering this point, I would like to say that I fail to 
understand why, despite warnings from Gilbert Simondon, certain readers see 
in his work «encyclopedism». In addition to the somewhat dangerous need to 
qualify an entire work with a single word, the reason for this could be some 
prejudices of readers making Simondon an heir to Bachelard or others. 
Simondon’s work should not be reduced to a filiation to other thinkers. This 
would lead to simplistic and misleading interpretations.  If one is interested in 
philosophical Simondon heritage, one should read the chapter «History of the 
notion of the individual»14 of ILFI. He inherits from the whole of the philosophy, 
nothing less, and this heritage is not a heredity: he selects, approves, collects the 
predecessors with the same generosity, be it the Ancients or his contemporaries. 
 I am now coming back to the last element of your question, on 
humanism. On the subject of humanism, you refer to a humanism with scientific 
matrix, or a science deeply imbued with humanism. I am not sure to understand 
what science deeply imbued with humanism could be. But is there in Simondon’s 
work a humanism, and namely a humanism with scientific matrix? If there is 
humanism, it is not with a scientific matrix, but with a reflective basis, i.e. 
philosophical, simply like all other historical humanisms Simondon refers to. 
Again, science cannot lead philosophy, it can enlighten it at best. 
 So now I deal with your question: is there a humanism in Gilbert 
Simondon’s work? I’ll answer by using what Simondon says about humanism. 
 On the one hand, Simondon criticizes «an easy humanism» (MEOT), 
which means a «too easy» humanism, a cheap humanism allowing people, by 
refusing the human content of technics, to make it a stranger, an enemy, and by 
doing so, to believe that technophobia is the best defence of mankind in danger. 
It is therefore a criticism of a simplistic position consisting in identifying human 
through a narrow vision built by rejection, and namely by misoneism. Simondon 
rejects this kind of humanism. 
 On the other hand, he acknowledges the value of various historical 
manifestations of what is also called humanism, of all sorts of humanism, 
through which people, grasping themselves in their complete and intelligible 
 
14 See G.Simondon, L'individuation à la lumière des notions de forme et d'information, pp. 357-519. 
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reality, overcome their alienations. Alienation is understood here following Marx 
or Feuerbach, as something which rejects a part of human reality, this part being 
erected as a powerful transcendental value, but also hostile and dominating, 
inspiring fear (like God for Feuerbach, like technics in the 20th century). This is 
according to this sense of the word humanism that Simondon calls sometimes 
for a more appropriate, less alienated realization of human reality (namely 
through an adequate thought of technics). 
 We can see that there is a narrow humanism and a liberating humanism, 
the former built on a closed and frozen idea of man, the latter trying to gather 
the whole human, even under its apparently new or foreign forms, and this one 
is approved by Simondon. I wouldn't go as far as saying that this work 
constitutes a humanism: it is not pivotal enough. But I would say that his work 
brings its contribution to the battle against various forms of alienation. 
 Let us now define more accurately the contribution of the ILFI analysis 
to this liberating and mature humanism. The study of individuation is crucial 
here, because it reveals that radical partitions between human reality and other 
realities should be relativized: for instance between man and animal, there is 
more proximity than what is the case in the legacy of the dualism of classical 
philosophy. ILFI claims that spirituality can be thought even if one doesn't 
assume a soul separated from body. Soul and body are concepts at the limit, 
unpractical to think man in its reality, and spirituality is better explained when 
taking into account human individuation through its different modes, vital, 
psychical and transindividual. Realities are transductive, and therefore humanism 
cannot be established on a human nature whose frontiers cannot be defined 
accurately. This is then opposed to a ‘closing’ humanism through which man 
would be seen as a being superior to everything else, for instance, but this 
favours the reappropriation by man of his complete reality (with namely his 
ability to change, to individuate in the collective, something alienated in social 
life). Yet, this work, which includes reflections on man, moral, politics, cannot 
be identified to humanism more than to moral or political theory. 
 To summarize, the question for Gilbert Simondon is not about 
overcoming the partitions between science and philosophy. Philosophy can 
manage on its own, and it learns from science, but does not become science. It 
is important to be accurate on this point. 
 
3). Following this thread, we believe it is really interesting to deepen the 
relationship between philosophy and engineering. Historically speaking, 
philosophy has always had a fraught and, sometimes, openly inimical 
relationship with engineering. Fixated with the abstract acrobatics of 
theoretical physics, philosophy has always wilfully neglected or scorned 
the concreteness of engineering. Nonetheless, philosophy seems to be 
having a timely change of heart on this subject: we are hearing more and 
more about the possibilities of conceptual engineering and more and 
more philosophers are discovering the possibilities of world-building, 
terraforming and the importance of pragmatic cunning. What do you 
think of conceptual engineering? Do you think that a turn towards 
engineering as a practice of systematic planning of the various 
components of the world could be beneficial for the philosophy-to-come? 
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What is Gilbert Simondon’s relationship with engineering, conceptual or 
otherwise?   
 
MEOT acknowledges the importance of the relation between science and 
technics, and even makes technics an extraordinary rapport to the real that 
instructs science, develops objectivity… because it is an invention of new 
structures. Concerning engineering, it should be noted that what gives value to 
technics is precisely that it is not purely conceptual nor theoretical. Even an 
encyclopedic approach to technics is not adequate: the second part of MEOT 
insists on technical education. Technics managed from above by the engineer 
leads to authoritative technicism, that is socially cleaving, alienating, and makes 
the operator obedient to machines as well as to decision makers. This is the 
critique of the polytechnicians. According to Gilbert Simondon, salvation, for 
engineering, consists then in a better taking into account of the role of the 
operator, and also in a better technical culture, but not in planning performed 
by overhanging thinkers playing today the role of the Saint-Simonians in the 19th 
century. 
Four comments could be added on the subject of conceptual engineering: 
- In Simondon’s work, there is a critique of ‘deductive technics’15. When the 
engineer deducts, he can be wrong and design dangerous machines, because the 
real is always more complex and difficult to tame than the conceptual approach. 
Casting defects in steel and material breaking cannot be avoided if empirical 
information is not used. If theory is more and more able to deduct, it is under 
the condition that empirical knowledge be included in design methodology, 
although not fully; direct learning from the real is essential. 
- There is a danger in every technique applied to man, because it misses the 
veritable human dimension16: then a concept of general planning has this aim, it 
seeks to be transformed into a decision-making technique, which is always a 
source of domination of man by man, and looks opposite to the quest for socially 
shared wisdom and maturity, a hope of Simondon. 
- ‘Human engineering’ valued by Simondon in MEOT has a very different 
meaning: this is about the rapport between man and machine, about the 
workplace, and this remains an essential point for the rapport between man and 
technics. 
- On all these questions in general, there is no ‘ars inveniendi’: there is no technical 
way to invent, and Gilbert Simondon insists on the serious mistake resulting 
from the confusion between invention and creativity17.  
 
4). On this note, there is a weird concern in Simondon’s work which has 
always fascinated us. It is the fundamental core, we believe, of what he 
called his mechanology and it is an idea which might seem odd at first: 
technical objects are alienated, divided from themselves. This idea, as Yuk 
Hui as noted,18 becomes extremely clear in a brief abstract which was 
 
15 See G.Simondon, Sur la technique, note p. 451. 
16 See G.Simondon, Du mode d’existence des objects technique, p. 294. 
17 See the chapter «Invention et créativité», in G. Simondon, La résolution des problems, PUF, Paris 
2018.
18 Y. Hui, On the soul of technical objects: commentary on Simondon’s ‘Technics and eschatology’, in «Theory, 
culture and society», vol. 35 n. 6, 2018. 
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included in the collection of essays On technic titled Technics and 
eschatology19. In this small fragment Simondon describes the realm of 
technical objects as a kingdom of divided souls, looking for a higher form 
of completion and understanding beyond the strictures of both our naïve 
humanism and the inhuman disenchantment of the world brought forth 
by the industrial revolution. Without losing ourselves in the nooks and 
crannies of this very obscure and complex passage of the Simondonian 
oeuvre, we could say that he was advocating for a sort of militancy to 
regain the soul of objects, without fully succumbing to a Spinozist 
panpsychism or an Enlighted nihilism. A militancy for a new technical 
intimacy and to rediscover the profundity of the products of our craft, we 
could say. As Hui puts it, it as a vison of « […] a future» in which «all 
technical objects could be repaired and modified, and the owners would 
be capable of doing so – like hackers or handymen»20. Do you believe that 
this assessment is correct? What do you think of Gilbert Simondon’s 
mechanology? Do you think that we should follow his advice and re-
discover the soul and the higher purpose of our technical objects? And 
would you say that our technical objects are alienated? 
 
I must admit that I am very surprised by your question: I have read again and 
again «Technique et Eschatologie» and I can’t find any mention of this world of 
technical objects as a ‘kingdom of divided souls’. The first sentence of the text 
exposes that ‘human eschatology’ calls for a principle of duality: ‘soul survives 
body’ and the question is raised to know whether such a duality can be found in 
technics, i.e. whether one can distinguish two things, one that lasts and one that 
doesn't. The text shows that the duality in question can be first identified as an 
opposition yard-tool (the tool stays at the end of the work) for technics, as a 
distinction between materiality and meaning of the work for art, and investigates 
more generally the conditions for technical objects durability (standardization, 
etc…) at different times. I can’t find either this mystical idea of a ‘kingdom of 
souls’ in the other elements of the work, that in my opinion is quite a lesson of 
rigor and rational examination of technics rather than the sigh of a worried, 
abscons and fascinated-fascinating thinker. Therefore I see nowhere in his work 
a reason for «weird concern» or oddity. On the contrary, the analysis is rigorous 
and does not give credit to a panpsychism hidden behind an intimacy of 
technical objects. Suffice to remember to what extent Gilbert Simondon 
endeavors to mark a definitive distinction between technical objects and the 
living: technical objects will never be like the living, because they contain always 
a remainder of abstraction. He criticizes superficial comparisons between 
technical objects and the living (as proposed by unwise promoters of 
cybernetics) which are always of the order of a myth, of the taste of the 
wonderful. As for the technical object essence, its ‘intimacy’, this is simply a 
functioning, a material structure harboring effective causalities. The technical 
object has no soul, it has its own 'mode of existence’. 
 Then, why does Simondon say that technical objects can be alienated? 
This is in the sense that they can be misused, enslaved. This thought might be 
 
19 G. Simondon, Sur la technique, PUF, Paris 2013, pp. 331-336. 
20 Y. Hui, On the soul of technical objects, p. 12. 
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difficult to understand by those who don’t understand the value of technical 
objects and only see utility objects (the same who could clearly agree on speaking 
of soul about a work of art), but Simondon insists on this point throughout 
MEOT: technical objects are far more than simple utensils, utility objects. They 
are the result of human invention, they provide a functioning, they exist through 
a process of concretization and for this reason, they bear in them the invention 
effort, the creative thought that produced them; in addition, and very 
importantly, through them they transmit this technicity to other people. Nothing 
complicated here: such an object, when wasted, misused, roughly treated, 
dumped, or alternatively bought and shown to others just to show off, is 
mistreated, is treated as a slave and used with no consideration for its nature. 
Simondon writes: «this under use, opposite to their own finality, to their 
invention and functioning scheme, denatures and absurdly annihilates them»21. 
 Technical objects are objects, beings, thrown into economic and social 
life after being produced, and they can be considered adequately or not. For 
Simondon, there is a true relationship to technical objects, as there is also a 
degrading relationship. To say that they can be alienated means that there is in 
them something that must remain free and well treated. This something is just 
the fact that technical objects are the result of invention, of an inventive thought, 
that prompted a technical scheme and that are for this reason irreplaceable and 
should be unforgettable or at least saved. This something expresses the free and 
generous thinking that invented it in a free rapport to the real (free as liberated 
from social group pressure). Despise and ignore the technical value of objects 
just used is equivalent to despise this human part of inventive thought that is 
true, because it confronts the real, free from social or cultural prejudices. There 
is truth and freedom in technics. As discussed in the vigorous introduction to 
MEOT, technics is mistreated by culture but also by users who meet economic 
constraints their own way. Technical objects obsolescence was organized, they 
have been loaded with non-technical fittings to the point that old fashioned 
objects are dumped (there is no fashion for what is true and works). They are 
treated as consumables, as disposable, whereas they contain effort, truth and 
inventive freedom. Is it possible to consume and dispose of truth and freedom 
conquered and concretized by others? This is more or less what Simondon 
criticizes in the waltz of the consumer society. 
 Finally, to say that technical objects are alienated is not to accept that 
they have a soul (Simondon does not even think that men have a soul!), it is just 
to say that they are enslaved to needs with no consideration for their essence 
and with only contempt for their value. Personally, I can only see common sense 
in this, and no romantic or mystical anthropomorphism. 
 Now, for the future, the question is not to keep, to repair, to tinker 
everything. Clearly, Simondon is opposed to generalized wasting of energy and 
manufactured products, but his thought goes beyond the dimension of tinkering, 
even if he regrets the production of closed technical objects impossible to repair. 
What must really be saved are the technical schemes For Simondon techniques 
«are not completely and forever in the past. They harbor a permanent schematic 
power that should be saved, preserved»22.  
 
21 G.Simondon, Sur la technique, p.47. 
22 Ivi, p.447. 
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 For your last question rediscover the soul and the higher purpose of our 
technical object, I’ll just say that technical objects have no soul nor higher 
purpose apart their functioning. Technical objects are never only utensils, things 
defined by their usage. MEOT insists on the significant mistake made about 
technics when it is considered as the domain of utensils. Technical objects are 
much more than utensils, they are defined by their functioning and not their 
function, by their invention and their technical scheme. They are also less than 
objects with a high finality, because such an idea would confer to technics an 
autonomy, an own adventure: exactly what would make it an enemy. Technical 
objects are what they are, they function, they are invented, they are used, they 
last more or less according to the socio-economic life, they are more or less 
recognized for what they are worth, and their adventure as objects among us 
involves certain values, a quality of the relationship to others, to the past, to the 
inventor, operator, manufacturer, relationship that as such is susceptible to result 
from a moral elevation or its contrary. 
 What Gilbert Simondon suggests is that our technical objects are 
alienated whenever we ourselves are alienated when we use them wrongly or 
when we ignore their essence and their value, somewhat the same way we are 
alienated when we alienate others by disregarding their being.  
 
5). There has been, at least since Foucault’s death of Man, a great deal of 
discussions about the deflation and the reassessment of the position that 
we as a species occupy on this planet. We are witnessing a deflation of the 
ontological status of the human in our contemporary world. Nonetheless, 
Simondon seems to have an odd position in these debates. If read 
thoroughly and correctly, as, for example, Jean-Hughes Berthélémy has 
done,23 Simondon looks a lot like a classical humanist, troubled by the 
necessity of upholding our values in the face of planetary process and 
unimaginable revolutions. He seems, at times, a sort of cyborg Jacques 
Ellul, thoroughly skeptical towards modernity and advocating for a 
humane transvaluation of all values and a renewed human ethics. What 
do you think of this «difficult humanism»? And do you agree with Muriel 
Combes’ definition of the Simondonian perspective as an ‘humanism after 
the end of man’, a humanism without man that it is built on the ruins of 
anthropology24? Ultimately, is it possible to say that in Simondon operates 
an open process of re-semantisation of the concept of humanity, 
according to a systemic logic of relations? 
 
Your question comes back to the second one on some points. I am a little bit 
perplexed to have to comment again on statements made by other people, as 
you prompt me to, and I’ll comment freely the expressions you mention without 
referring to their authors, as I don't fancy polemics. I would like to add to the 
answer to this second question that, if humanism there is, it does not look at all 
troubled by the necessity of upholding our values. This formulation appears to 
 
23 J. H. Berthélémy, Simondon, Les Belles Lettre, Paris 2014. 
24 M.Combes, La relazione transindividuale, in Il Transindividuale. Soggetti, relazioni, mutazioni, a cura 
di Etienne Balibar e Vittorio Morfino, Mimesis, Milano-Udine 2014, p.77. 
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me very distant from the questions discussed by Gilbert Simondon. On the 
contrary, the last part of ILFI proposes an analysis of values based on the 
concept of individuation, analysis which looks extremely bold and is a radical 
criticism of frozen ethics. It criticizes namely any ethics of principles (see ILFI 
conclusion). On the other hand, I would find reductive and misleading that this 
analysis be considered primarily as «humanism», even if, of course, Simondon 
uses the traditional vocabulary, the word ‘humanism’, to insist on the way man 
can overcome what alienates him. 
 But more importantly, to talk about «difficult humanism» as suggested is 
really clouding the debate voluntarily. Gilbert Simondon would probably be 
discouraged before these formulations. What is to be understood is that easy 
humanism, too easy, not deeply thought, is criticized by Simondon. To his eyes, 
veritable humanism questions man before it gives itself an essence of man. It is 
certainly clear that his thought is not anti-humanist, but it advocates an idea of 
man as involving a reflective understanding and not a reductionist or spiritualist 
or materialist approach to man, it is simply the idea of mankind capable of 
evolving. To say that we should be rigorous on such a subject doesn't make it a 
humanism, and certainly not a «difficult humanism».  At least, this question is 
controversial, and I remember Gilles Châtelet, indignated, in a lecture in ENS 
(École Normale Supérieure, rue d’Ulm) in 1994, by the idea that one could talk 
about humanism in the philosophy of Simondon. 
Are we talking about the death of man? The problematics of the death 
of man look quite distant from Simondon’s analysis. His philosophy thinks man 
in the real, a man still living and present, bearer of his future, not the man of 
social science, but the man of philosophical thought, with its bundle of 
problems: existence, relationship to others, values, affectivity, rationality, action. 
Nothing here is obsolete with Simondon. What is refused is only a reductionist, 
fixist and categorizing vision of man. It’s anything but classic. 
 Is there a re-semantisation of the concept of humanity? I don’t think so, 
not in intention nor in result, even if I am not really sure to see what this could 
mean for Simondon. There is mainly an effort to think the whole of the real in 
a domain that science, even social science cannot invest, this domain being the 
reflexion on the problems human existence is facing. This cannot be reduced to 
a systemic logic of relations, even if ILFI acknowledges clearly the reality of 
relations. Such a systemic logic would be a closure, but individuation cannot be 
known nor systematized. Unexpected and fortuitous events happen, and there 
still are men, actions, emotions and relations. Talk about humanism without 
humanity looks modern, possibly fashionable (intellectually fashionable) but 
misleading. ILFI and MEOT are the work of a man addressing to others and 
claiming it despite the absolute discretion of the author on this point. 
 Please allow me to thank you for your stimulating questions. I did my 
best to answer, possibly too abruptly. I am conscious to have been in the position 
to have to criticize some commentaries, which I regret. I believe that what is 
essential is to read the Simondon’s texts directly, without preconceived ideas. As 
editor of Gilbert Simondon’s work, this is my main wish. 
